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DID ISRAEL VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW DURING OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE?
Pat Andriola
On July 8, 2014, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had
launched “Operation Protective Edge,” a military intervention into the Gaza
territory. The IDF stated that the goals of Protective Edge were “aimed to
retrieve stability to the residents of southern Israel, eliminate Hamas’
capabilities and destroy terror infrastructure operating against the State of
Israel and its civilians.”1 Less than two months later, at least 2,131 Palestinians
had been killed, 1,473 of whom were civilians and 501 children.2
This Essay seeks to make two assessments. First, it will analyze the
military actions taken by Israel over the course of the summer of 2014 and
determine if they comport with customary international humanitarian law.
Specifically, this Essay will argue that Israel very likely violated the Principle
of Distinction, Collective Punishment, and Proportionality throughout the
course of the operation. The second assessment is to determine if there was any
evidence to point to the existence of international law, in opposition to the
Realist position that international law “does not exist.” This Essay will argue
that actions taken by Israel to ostensibly notify the civilian population of Gaza
of imminent attacks was direct evidence of the existence of international law.
However, this Essay will also argue that Israel used these necessary
requirements (e.g., the warning of civilians in the region of pending military
strikes) to create the impression that it had complied with all areas of
international law during the invasion.

 The author received his J.D. and M.B.A. from New York University in 2015. The author would like to
thank Professors James Hsiung and Ryan Goodman, as well as Jamie Kleinberg, Mike Cilento, and his family.
All mistakes are his own.
1 Operation ‘Protective Edge’ Commences as IDF Targets Terror Sites in the Gaza Strip, ISR. DEF.
FORCES (July 8, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/08/operation-protective-edge-commences-asidf-targets-terror-sites-in-the-gaza-strip/.
2 U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY: GAZA EMERGENCY SITUATION REPORT 1 (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf [hereinafter OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY REPORT SEPT. 2014].
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
A. Legal Background
The Principle of Distinction is a well-settled tenet of the jus in bello branch
of customary international law: unless they are to take up arms and thus
become combatants during hostilities, civilians are afforded full protection
against attacks. This rule is specifically enshrined in Article 48 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which states that:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
3
direct their operations only against military objectives.

The Israeli Supreme Court itself has stated that it is bound by customary
international law, including Article 48.4 One of the key goals of international
humanitarian law has been to try to shield innocents from the violent
geopolitical battles that go on around them. Without it, not only could warring
states fire indiscriminately without worry, taking civilians as collateral
damage, but civilians could become strategic targets themselves, one of the
greatest concerns of the international community. In this light, we can see why
the Principle of Distinction is so important, and why the International Criminal
Court (ICC), under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, declares it a war crime to
“[direct] attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.”5 Similarly, in the following
subsections of Article 8, direct attacks on either “civilian objects . . . which are
not military objectives” or “personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations” are also deemed war crimes.6

3 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I].
4 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 23 (2006) (Isr.), http://www.
haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Israel/Targetted_Killings_Supreme_Court_13-12-2006.pdf.
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002.
6 Id.
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B. The Civilian/Combatant Problem in Gaza
Key definitional and conceptual issues still remain after we have
recognized that civilians and combatants must be differentiated during conflict.
Namely, what is a citizen and what is a combatant? Article 43(2) of Additional
Protocol I defines combatants as “members of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict,” excluding certain medical and religious personnel.7 Civilians are
subsequently defined negatively, i.e., as being “not combatants.” Article 50 of
the Protocol defines civilians as anyone who is not a combatant under Article
43, and similarly the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in the Blaškić case of 2000, stated that civilians are “persons who
are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces.”8
One of the main areas of disagreement between Israel and the foreign press
(as well as human rights groups) was over combatant/civilian fatality statistics.
On August 5, 2014, in the wake of a short-lived Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, a
senior Israeli military official estimated that 900 Hamas operatives had been
killed at a time when health officials were estimating over 1,800 deaths.9 This
would place the ratio of combatants to civilians at or near 1:1. Meanwhile, the
United Nations (U.N.) was saying that of the 1,843 Palestinians killed, a total
of 1,354 were civilians.10 That represents about a twenty-three percent
difference between the counts of the IDF and U.N.
Much of this discrepancy has to do with the way in which Operation
Protective Edge was fought. Hamas, the controlling political party of the Gaza
Strip, is not formally permitted to have an army, although they do have a
military wing entitled The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (al-Qassam).
Because much of al-Qassam’s work is forced underground due to the
continued presence of Israel in the region, trying to figure out who is and who
is not is a soldier for al-Qassam is somewhat difficult. The geography and
density of Gaza, combined with underground troops, also mean that civilians
and combatants are constantly pushed closer to one another, especially when
there is significant destruction to civilian centers.
7

Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43(2).
Prosecutor v. Tihamir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
9 Adiv Sterman, 900 Operatives Killed Over Gaza Campaign, IDF Says, TIMES ISR. (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/900-operatives-killed-over-gaza-campaign-idf-says/.
10 U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY: GAZA EMERGENCY SITUATION REPORT 1 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_sitrep_07_08_2014.pdf.
8
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Because Hamas has also recently taken up guerilla tactics in their battles,
including the building of intricate tunnel systems that have even allowed them
to enter Israel, the problem of accurate identification is compounded.11
Likewise, rocket attacks, which are the primary way Hamas engages in war
with Israel, are often activated with timers in various locations in order to
shield operations.12 One Western photojournalist covering Gaza in the summer
of 2014 said that he “didn’t see a rocket at point of launch,” while an American
reporter said that, “[y]ou couldn’t tell exactly where a rocket was being
launched from.”13 One correspondent in the region put the civilian/combatant
distinction most strikingly: “Hamas isn’t a regular army: When they leave the
fighting areas, they don’t wear uniforms or carry guns.”14 These features
contribute to the difficulty in effectively applying the Principle of Distinction.
C. Attacks on Non-Military Hamas Officials
Israel has also made a habit of targeting Hamas politicians and officials,
who would not be considered “combatants” under customary international law
(just as it would be illegal for Hamas to target the home of a member of
Knesset, the Israeli parliament).15 However, an attorney at Human Rights
Watch, a humanitarian advocacy group, said that, “Israel has a very liberal
definition of who qualifies [as a combatant] . . . Israel’s labeling of certain
individuals as ‘terrorists’ does not make them military targets as a matter of
law.”16 The attorney is correct: although Israel may deem certain politicians or
people providing substantive aid to Hamas to be “terrorists,” they are not
“combatants” under the definition of Article 43, and thus the Principle of
Distinction (as codified in Article 48) dictates that targeting them is a war
crime.17

11

Terrence McCoy, How Hamas Uses Its Tunnels to Kill and Capture Israeli Soldiers, WASH. POST
(July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/21/how-hamas-uses-itstunnels-to-kill-and-capture-israeli-soldiers/.
12 Ahmed Hadi, Gaza: An Exclusive Look into the Roles of al-Qassam Brigades and Islamic Jihad, ALAKHBAR (July 14, 2014), http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20730.
13 Anshel Pfeffer, Foreign Press: Hamas Didn’t Censor Us in Gaza, They Were Nowhere to be Found,
HAARETZ (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.609589.
14 Id.
15 Israel Destroys 2 Gaza High-Rises in Escalation, DENVER POST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.
denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_26400618/gaza-israel-targets-hamas-officials-home-2-die.
16 Jodi Rudoren, Civilian or Not? New Fight in Tallying the Dead from the Gaza Conflict, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/middleeast/civilian-or-not-new-fight-in-tallyingthe-dead-from-the-gaza-conflict.html.
17 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 48.

ANDRIOLA GALLEYSFINAL

2015]

12/11/2015 11:22 AM

OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE

2005

D. Attacks on Civilian Centers
Despite the camouflage tactics of Hamas, there were clear instances in the
summer of 2014 of violations of Article 8(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the Rome
Statute: namely, the targeting of civilian centers and humanitarian operations.
Israel certainly has the right to defend itself, as has been stated in a 2004
advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.18 However, Israel must
still abide by the Principle of Distinction. For example, on July 30, 2014,
Israeli forces shelled the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza, which was being run
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as a school for
over 3,000 young Palestinian girls displaced by the war.19 According to an
UNRWA spokesperson, the U.N. had warned Israel of the exact location and
coordinates of the refugee camp seventeen times.20 The attack, which Israel
claimed was in response to mortar fire launched from the territory, resulted in
at least fifteen casualties and dozens of injuries.21 The events received such
scorn on an international basis that even the United States (U.S.), Israel’s most
loyal ally, released a statement condemning the attack, while Ban Ki-moon, the
Secretary-General of the U.N., said that “[n]othing is more shameful than
attacking sleeping children.”22 Moreover, Navi Pillay, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, stated the day after the attacks that Israel had
most likely committed war crimes for attacking civilian areas.23
This violation of international law was nothing new to the humanitarians at
Jabalia. In January of 2009, during another conflict between Israel and Gaza
(Operation Cast Lead), Israeli tanks fired upon an UNRWA school/refugee
camp in the region, killing over forty Palestinians, including children.24 Israel
initially claimed that “two Hamas militants . . . were in the building and firing

18

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 140 (July 9).
19 Israeli Fire Kills Nineteen in Gaza UN School, AL JAZEERA (July 31, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2014/07/gaza-un-school-hit-201473041918975321.html.
20 Id.
21 Gaza Conflict: UN Accuses Israel over Jabaliya Attack, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-28558433.
22 Barak Ravid, UN Chief Condemns ‘Shameful’ Shelling of School in Gaza, HAARETZ (July 30, 2014),
http://www.haaretz.com/1.608078.
23 Israel Must be Probed for War Crimes by World Powers, UN Rights Chief Says, JERUSALEM POST
(July 31, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Israel-must-be-probed-for-war-crimes-byworld-powers-UN-rights-chief-says-369589.
24 ‘Stray Mortar’ Hit UN Gaza School, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/7823204.stm.
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rockets.”25 In order to corroborate their claim, the IDF showed a video of what
they alleged were gunmen shooting from the schoolyard.26 However, the video
was shown to be from October of 2007, making it impossible for it to be an
accurate video of the incident.27 Israel later admitted their claims about
gunmen and the video were incorrect, and said that the attack was an accident
caused by a “stray mortar.”28
However, the Jabalia incident was not the first time Israel had attacked a
UNRWA school/refugee camp. In fact, just six days earlier Israeli tanks
shelled the “Beit Hanoun preparatory school for refugees,” killing sixteen
Palestinians and wounding hundreds.29 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner of the
IDF claimed that rockets had been fired from the region, though not from the
school itself, and that Israel hit the school accidentally as the result of several
rockets that had fallen short of their targets, hitting civilians instead.30 Once
again, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the act.31
Similarly, Israel struck a school/refugee camp in Zeitoun in the beginning
of August, resulting in over ten deaths (eight of which were children) and
dozens of injuries, after claiming that mortars were being fired nearby by
Hamas combatants.32 The U.N. claimed it had warned Israel of the location of
the school thirty-three times, including as early as one hour before the attack.33
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon once again expressed his dismay, calling

25 Jonathan Miller, Why UN ‘Reversal’ Over Gaza School Should Be Treated With Caution, CHANNEL 4
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/middle_east/why+un+reversal+over+
gaza+school+should+be+treated+with+caution/2924657.html.
26 Patrick Martin, Account of Israeli Attack Doesn’t Hold up to Scrutiny, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 29, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/account-of-israeli-attack-doesnt-hold-up-to-scru
tiny/article4286191/.
27 Andrew England, Anger as School Bomb Victims Buried, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2009, 7:29 PM), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b805b46-dceb-11dd-a2a9-000077b07658.html.
28 ‘Stray Mortar’ Hit UN Gaza School, supra note 24.
29 Asmaa al-Ghoul, Israel Shells Fall on UN School During Evacuation, AL-MONITOR (July 25, 2014),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/unrwa-refugee-schools-gaza-targeted-israel.html.
30 Ben Hubbard & Jodi Rudoren, Blasts Kill 16 Seeking Haven at Gaza School, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/world/middleeast/despite-talk-of-a-cease-fire-no-lull-in-gaza-fight
ing.html.
31 ‘Appalled’ By Attack on UN-Run School in Gaza, Ban Urges Halt to All Fighting, UN NEWS CTR.
(July 24, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48341#.VICyN1fF_8w.
32 Jason Burke, Gaza School Attack Denounced as ‘Criminal Act’ by UN Chief, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/03/israel-air-strike-un-school-gaza-rafah.
33 Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.hrw.
org/news/2014/09/11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks.
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the attack a “moral outrage and a criminal act.”34 A report from Human Rights
Watch that came out in September 2014 gave an in-depth analysis of the
attacks on the three schools, finding as follows:
Two of the three attacks Human Rights Watch investigated—in Beit
Hanoun and Jabalya—did not appear to target a military objective or
were otherwise unlawfully indiscriminate. The third attack in Rafah
was unlawfully disproportionate if not otherwise indiscriminate.
Unlawful attacks carried out willfully—that is, deliberately or
35
recklessly—are war crimes.

Given the propensity for Israel to attack schools, and the lack of (and
sometimes contradictory) evidence provided by the IDF that combatants were
in the area, it is very possible Israel’s attacks on these three schools constitute
war crimes under the Rome Statute.
However, schools and refugee camps were not the only civilian centers
attacked during Operation Protective Edge. One of the most infamous attacks
on a civilian object during the summer of 2014 was on a center for the
handicapped and disabled, called the Mabaret Palestine Society. Two residents
were killed, including a disabled thirty-nine year-old woman who, according to
her family, “had been born severely disabled and unable to speak.”36 The IDF
claimed once again that the bombing was a mistake, and that they would
investigate.37 Thus far there has been no update or explanation from the IDF as
to its investigation.
Similarly, on July 20, 2014, Israeli forces struck al-Aqsa hospital, located
in central Gaza, resulting in the deaths of five civilians.38 According to the
director of the hospital, there was no reason for an attack, and in retaliation to
accusations from Israeli military sources who claimed anti-tank missiles were
stored near the hospital, the director said, “[t]here are no weapons in
our hospital. We are ready for any inspection. Any international organization
34 Gaza Crisis: Deadly Strike ‘At UN School In Rafah,’ BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-28628682#TWEET1199954.
35 Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks, supra note 33.
36 Steven Erlanger, As Israel Hits Mosque and Clinic, Air Campaign’s Risks Come Home, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-strip.html.
37 Yonah Jeremy Bob, Exclusive: IDF Source Says Investigation into Gaza Hospital Incident—Not an
Attack, JERUSALEM POST (July 21, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Damage-to-Gazahospital-was-caused-by-attack-on-nearby-rocket-launcher-363629.
38 Deaths as Israeli Tanks Shell Gaza Hospital, AL JAZEERA (July 21, 2014, 8:55 PM), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/deaths-as-israeli-tanks-shell-gaza-hospital-2014721124111171397.
html.
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can come and make sure we have nothing in our hospital.”39 Although Israel
has claimed to have accidentally hit a number of civilian areas and objects,
there were also times, such as with al-Aqsa, that they claimed civilians were
being used as “human shields,” or that military operations were being hidden
beneath layers of superficial civilian facades, such as mosques,40 community
centers, schools, and hospitals.41
E. Article 52(3) of Protocol I
Importantly, when pressed about the attack on al-Aqsa and other civilian
centers, the spokesperson for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said,
“[y]ou are allowed to hit targets where their [Hamas] war machine is using to
hide rockets . . . I have no doubt Hamas uses, has used and continues to use,
hospitals . . . we do not target civilians.”42 However, Israel is not clarifying the
law when it comes to civilian centers that may be being used as military
outlets, which Hamas has been guilty of as recently as July of 2014.43 Article
52(3) of Protocol I clearly states:
In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution
44
to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.

Therefore, it is accurate for Prime Minister Netanyahu to claim that civilian
dwellings used for military purposes are generally subject to attack. However,
a large hurdle has been that there is no check on Israel’s claim that Hamas is
attacking from the dwellings, and unless Israel is positive (i.e., when there is
no “doubt,” as Article 52(3) states),45 the presumption should be against
attacking. As was the case with al-Aqsa, unless Israel is withholding evidence
from the international community, from the basis of intelligence on the ground
and the director of the hospital it appears that there was certainly enough doubt

39

Id.
Gaza Fighting Rages on as Hundreds of Israelis Flee Homes, CBS NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014, 10:15 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-targets-2-gaza-mosques-in-latest-airstrikes/.
41 Hamas’ Use of Human Shields is a War Crime, ISR. DEF. FORCES (July 14, 2014), http://www.idfblog.
com/blog/2014/07/14/hamas-use-human-shields-war-crime/.
42 Deaths as Israeli Tanks Shell Gaza Hospital, supra note 38.
43 UNRWA Investigating Discovery of 20 Rockets Found in Empty Gaza School, GUARDIAN (July 17,
2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/unrwa-investigating-20-rockets-emptygaza-school-palestinian.
44 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(3) (emphasis added).
45 Id.
40
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to trigger the presumption required in Article 52(3). In fact, when U.N. Human
Rights Council inspectors attempted to enter Israel in November of 2014 in
order to determine if any war crimes were committed during Protective Edge,
Israel blocked them, claiming that an impartial investigation was impossible
because the U.N. has an “obsessive hostility toward Israel.”46
Israel may very well be correct: if Hamas is systematically hiding weapons,
soldiers, and military apparatuses in civilian centers, not only are Israeli attacks
most likely legitimate under international law, but Hamas could be guilty of
war crimes themselves. However, the evidence is extremely spotty, many
civilian centers of all shapes and sizes have been attacked, and hundreds of
innocent civilians have been killed as a result. Israel can absolve itself of any
potential wrongdoing by providing clear and convincing evidence that their
attacks were not on civilian centers, but on military centers masquerading as
civilian centers. So far Israel has not shown that it has met this stringent
standard required by Article 52(3), and their refusal to comply with the U.N.
Human Rights Commissions infers that evidence may be lacking.
II. COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
A. Legal Background
The prohibition on collective punishment, or the punishing of individuals
not responsible for criminal action (but who often bear some relation to those
who may be), is a “fundamental guarantee” to all global citizens under Article
4(2)(b) of the Second Additional Protocol (Protocol II) to the Geneva
Conventions.47 Moreover, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states
the following:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures
of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited.

46

Israel Blocks U.N. Human Rights Inspectors from Entering Gaza to Investigate Civilian Deaths,
COUNTER CURRENT NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014, 7:47 PM), http://countercurrentnews.com/2014/11/israel-blocks-un-human-rights-inspectors-from-entering-gaza-to-investigate-civilian-deaths.
47 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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Reprisals against protected persons and their property are
48
prohibited.

While collective punishment is clearly banned as a tool of war under
international law, it is less clear as to whether it constitutes a “war crime.” For
example, the Rome Statute makes no specific mention of collective
punishment. However, there are two examples of international tribunals that,
through statute, had jurisdiction over collective punishment as a war crime:
The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.49 Still, there have been calls from the international community for the
ICC to formally introduce collective punishment as a statutory war crime.50
B. The Beginnings of Operation Protective Edge
Although Israel has claimed that routine security concerns stemming from
Hamas’ rocket fire and tunnel building were the main causes of Protective
Edge, there was a clear consensus from international commentary that much of
the clash stemmed from the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers
on June 12, 2014, a terrorist act that some members of Hamas took credit for,
although others within the organization denied culpability.51 The murders
shook the Israeli community, and three Jewish Israelis eventually responded
with a “revenge attack,” killing and setting on fire a sixteen year-old
Palestinian from East Jerusalem.52
The Israeli government responded to the attacks in a much more sweeping
manner: they conducted raids into the West Bank on Palestinian towns and
refugee camps, arresting over 150 people without charge and killing at least
five.53 From June to July 2014, Israel arrested roughly 700 Palestinians,
focusing on anyone even tangentially connected to members of Hamas, whom

48 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War art. 33, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
49 Shane Darcy, Prosecuting the War Crime of Collective Punishment: Is It Time to Amend the Rome
Statute?, J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 29, 34 (2010).
50 Id.
51 Orlando Crowcroft, Hamas Official: We Were Behind the Kidnapping of Three Israeli Teenagers,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/hamas-kidnapping-three-israeliteenagers-saleh-al-arouri-qassam-brigades.
52 Orlando Crowcroft, Three Jewish Israelis Admit Kidnapping and Killing Palestinian Boy, GUARDIAN
(July 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/14/three-jewish-israelis-charged-kidnappingkilling-palestinian-boy.
53 Israel: Serious Violations in West Bank Operations, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 3, 2014), http://www.
hrw.org/news/2014/07/03/israel-serious-violations-west-bank-operations.
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they said were responsible for the murder of the three Israeli boys.54 According
to Human Rights Watch:
[T]he scale of arbitrary arrests and detentions, unlawful use of force,
property destruction including home demolitions, and raids on homes
and media offices raise the collective punishment concerns. “Israel’s
search for those responsible for the appalling kidnappings and
killings of its citizens cannot justify unlawfully killing civilians,
destroying property, and detaining hundreds of Palestinians without
basic due process,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at
Human Rights Watch. “The teens’ killers should be brought to justice
55
but mass punishment without trial merely creates more injustice.”

Arresting 700 people for the deaths of three people, while also raiding and
demolishing the homes of family members, is not only excessive, but a very
clear case of punishing a community for the alleged crimes of a few.
For example, Israel arrested Palestinian West Bank resident Hussam
Qawasmeh, accusing him of involvement with the kidnapping and murder.56
However, rather than simply charging Hussam, Israeli officials destroyed his
family’s house, leaving his wife and family homeless. As Ghada Qawasmeh,
Hussam’s wife, said herself, “[t]his is collective punishment . . . . What did I or
my children do?”57 The Israeli Supreme Court heard an appeal from an Israeli
rights group not to demolish the house, but ruled in favor of the military,
stating that “the demolition of the houses was imperative to deter other
terrorists from committing additional severe terrorist attacks.”58
While the Supreme Court may very well be correct that home demolitions
(prior to any conviction, it should be noted) do deter terrorist attacks,
deterrence is not an exception to Article 4(2)(b) of Protocol II59 or Article 33
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.60 In fact, deterrence is a very logical reason
a country may wish to use collective punishment, which is precisely why the
international community has outlawed it via customary law in its aim to protect
innocent civilians hors de combat.
54

Id.
Id.
56 Rania Zabaneh & Dalia Hatuqa, Israeli Demolitions ‘Collective Punishment,’ AL JAZEERA (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/israeli-demolitions-collective-punishment-2014818
92047643368.html.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Additional Protocol II, supra note 47.
60 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 48.
55
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C. “Mowing The Lawn”
It is much easier to argue that collective punishment is occurring in a
discrete instance than over the course of many months, for example, with
Ghada Qawasmeh above. But it is also very likely that Israel’s treatment of
Gaza throughout the totality of Operation Protective Edge was tantamount to
collective punishment. To analogize, just as Ghada was not guilty for the
actions of her husband, the civilian population and their places of community
gathering were not guilty for the actions of Hamas, yet in both instances they
bore a large portion of the punishment.
Professor Noam Chomsky has argued that whenever Palestinians act
defiantly toward Israel, usually by exerting political power, Israel responds by
“mowing the lawn,” or causing large-scale destruction of civilian areas in
Gaza.61 Chomsky believes that Operation Protective Edge was a response to
the unity agreement formed by Hamas and Fatah (the West Bank political
party) in April of 2014.62 Chomsky argues that Israel, unhappy that the
moderate Fatah party was aligning itself with what they declared a terrorist
organization, sought to exact revenge on the Palestinians by “mowing the
lawn” once again, after which “the desperate population seeks to rebuild
somehow from the devastation and the murders.”63 Assuming Professor
Chomsky is correct, this would be a clear case of collective punishment on
Palestinian civilians, though it may delve too far into the realm of political
theory to be considered a viable legal argument.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
A. Legal Background
Conducting an individual attack in a disproportionate manner is contrary to
customary international humanitarian law under Article 51(5)(b) of Additional
Protocol I, codified as follows:
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:

61 Noam Chomsky, The Real Reason Israel “Mows the Lawn” in Gaza, ALTERNET (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.alternet.org/noam-chomsky-real-reason-israel-mows-lawn-gaza?page=0%2C2.
62 Id.
63 Noam Chomsky, Nightmare in Gaza, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/
item/25343-noam-chomsky-%7C-nightmare-in-gaza.
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(b) [A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
64
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Similar language is also used in Article 57, which covers precautions in
attack.65 It is immediately important to note the last phrase, which conditions
the damage on the “direct military advantage anticipated.” Therefore, all
proportionality calculi must weigh the cost of potential civilian life and
community damage against the military gain anticipated. This is clearly a
subjective test, and thus it is held to a “reasonableness” standard. As Professor
Laurie Blank of Emory University School of Law puts it, proportionality
“[requires] extensive steps to protect civilians and reasonable judgments about
the potential harm to civilians and the actions needed to minimize that harm.”66
However, this is a clear jus in bello standard, in that it relates to attacks
within the framework of an already existing conflict. While we may be able to
conduct such an analysis for individual attacks, the vast information
asymmetry between what military commanders know and what the public
knows as to prospective military advantages makes it extremely difficult to
decide if proportionality was violated on an individual attack level ex post
facto. Still, proportionality is required on a jus ad bellum basis as well,
whereby proportionality is measured as to the entire military operation,
including the same “reasonableness.”67
B. Analysis
We can now begin an analysis of whether the military objectives claimed
by Israel were “reasonable” compared to the civilian life lost. As stated earlier,
the IDF claimed that the central mission of Operation Protective Edge was to
“retrieve stability to the residents of southern Israel, eliminate Hamas’
capabilities and destroy terror infrastructure operating against the State of
Israel and its civilians.”68 “Stability” most likely refers to the barrage of
rockets that al-Qassam has sent in the direction of southern Israel over the past

64

Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b).
Id. art. 57.
66 Laurie R. Blank, Asymmetries and Proportionalities, HILL (July 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.
com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/213546-asymmetries-and-proportionalities.
67 See Raphaël Van Steenberghe, Proportionality Under Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clarifying
Their Relationship, 45 ISR. L. REV. 107, 116 (2012).
68 Operation ‘Protective Edge’ Commences, supra note 1.
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few years.69 However, according to Israel’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
prior to Operation Protective Edge, no Israeli (either “citizen” or “combatant”)
had been killed from rocket fire from a mortar attack since November 21 of
2012.70 It was only after Operation Protective Edge began, and Hamas
subsequently began firing more rockets, that Israelis were killed.
However, Israel could always argue that one must look at the whole
picture: rockets have been a consistent threat to Israeli peace and stability since
Hamas operatives began firing them roughly ten years ago. Looking at the
data, the number of total Israeli fatalities from rocket fire from 2004 (when
they began) to the beginning of Operation Protective Edge was thirty-five.71
Moreover, an Israeli has not died from a rocket or mortar attack that was not in
the midst of one of Israel’s “operations” since 2011.72 Of course there are other
costs to rocket attacks: civilian psychological trauma and the disruption of
everyday economic and cultural life being two.73 Still, according to the U.N.,
1,473 Palestinian civilians died during Operation Protective Edge alone,
including 501 children.74 These numbers seem entirely disproportionate ex
post facto. For example, the ratio of Palestinian children killed by Israel over
the course of Protective Edge’s two months to adult civilian and military
Israelis killed via Hamas rocket and mortar bombings over the course of the
ten years prior to Protective Edge is over 14:1. Israel could argue that it did not
know what the death toll would be ex ante, but the recent history should have
given them pause: 1,166 Palestinians died during the 2008-2009 Gaza War.75
One may argue that the presence of Hamas’ underground tunnels (which
IDF soldiers would eventually destroy) was a more serious threat that justified
the large-scale Israeli response, but there are three main problems with this line
of reasoning. First, despite claims from Israel that Hamas had built these
69

Rocket Attacks on Israel From Gaza, ISR. DEF. FORCES, http://www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocketattacks-toward-israel/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
70 Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/victims%20of%20palestinian%20violenc
e%20and%20terrorism%20sinc.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
71 Phan Nguyen, How Many People Have Died From Gaza Rockets into Israel?, MONDOWEISS (July 14,
2014), http://mondoweiss.net/2014/07/rocket-deaths-israel.
72 Id.
73 William M. Welch, Tel Aviv Flight Ban Cuts off Israelis, USA TODAY (July 23, 2014, 8:09 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/07/22/ben-gurion-airport/13015887/.
74 OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY REPORT SEPT. 2014, supra note 2.
75 Adam Taylor, The Lopsided Death Tolls in Israel-Palestinian Conflicts, WASH. POST (July 11, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/11/the-lopsided-death-tolls-in-israel-palestin
ian-conflicts/.
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tunnels to kill Israeli citizens, they had never been previously successful at
doing so. Second, there was an alternative option: they could attempt to seal
off the tunnels on their side of the border, rather than penetrating Gaza, which
was exactly what Egypt did after a Palestinian used the tunnels to kill sixteen
border guardsmen in 2012.76 Third, and possibly most problematic to the case
against proportionality, is that Israel did not mention the tunnels as a military
concern until after Operation Protective Edge had already begun. As was
reported by the BBC on July 31, 2014: “Israel’s offensive, named Operation
Protective Edge, began with a focus on Hamas’ rocket-launching capability.
But it has since expanded to take in the threat from tunnels. After air strikes
began, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) discovered an extensive network of
tunnels leading from Gaza into Israel.”77
By July 31, 2014, over 1,400 Palestinians had been killed, roughly 1,050 of
which were civilians.78 Therefore, Israel cannot justify the military advantage
gained from destroying tunnels until after 1,050 civilians had already been
killed. This means that jus ad bellum proportionality needs to be determined
primarily by reference to rocket attacks, which were the original reasons given
for Protective Edge, for all civilian destruction and lives lost from July 8th to
July 31st. Considering an Israeli had not been killed by a Palestinian rocket
during peacetime in three years, the case for Israel’s compliance with jus ad
bellum proportionality seems weak.
IV. THE EXISTENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING OPERATION
PROTECTIVE EDGE
A. The Realist Position
The Realist stance toward international law is usually framed in terms of
“existence” or “belief.” While there are some benefits to these terms, the
Realist position is a bit more complicated. Stephen M. Walt, a professor at the
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, as well as an international relations
expert and “Realist,” clarifies his school of thought:
76 In Wake of Sinai Attack, Egypt Moves to Seal Gaza Tunnels, HAARETZ (Aug. 7, 2012, 7:25 PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/in-wake-of-sinai-attack-egypt-moves-to-seal-gaza-tunnels-1.
456654.
77 Israel ‘to destroy’ Hamas Gaza Tunnels–Netanyahu, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-28582853.
78 Ian Deitch & Ibrahim Barzak, US, UN Announce Deal on 72-hour Gaza Cease-Fire, AP: THE BIG
STORY (Aug. 1, 2014, 12:54 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/israel-calls-another-16000-reserves.
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Of course realists “believe in” international law and institutions: they
exist, and we’d have to be blind to deny that basic fact. Moreover,
realists have long acknowledged that international law and
international institutions can be useful tools of statecraft, which states
can use to achieve their national interests. In particular, law and
institutions can help states coordinate their behavior so as to reap
greater gains or avoid various problems (think of the rules that
regulate air traffic, some forms of pollution, or global
communications), and they can also provide mechanisms to facilitate
international trade and to resolve various disputes. Where realists part
company with some (but not all) liberal idealists is in their emphasis
on the limits of institutions: they cannot force powerful states to act
against their own interests and they usually reflect the underlying
79
balance of power in important ways.

With this description of Realism in mind, whereby international law and
institutions “exist” but do not actually or effectively circumscribe what actions
states can take, we can see whether there was evidence of international law
during Operation Protective Edge, and if there was, whether it limited state
action.
B. Warning Palestinian Civilians
The most direct evidence of international law in action during Protective
Edge was Israel’s warnings to the Palestinian people of incoming attacks in
compliance with customary international humanitarian law. Article 57(2)(c) of
Protocol I requires that “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not
permit.”80 The IDF thus instituted a series of policies to warn civilian
populations of upcoming attacks in their area, including phone calls and text
messages, leaflet droppings, and “roof knockings,” whereby a building is hit
with a “safe bomb” that does no damage but makes a loud enough sound to
notify civilians that they are close to military targets or operations that will
soon be attacked.81 Israel was praised for taking these steps. For example, an
op-ed in The Jerusalem Post argued that Israel was taking “extraordinary
79 Stephen M. Walt, Do I Believe in International Law?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/09/do-i-believe-in-international-law/.
80 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(2)(c).
81 How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?, ISR. DEF. FORCES (July 16, 2014), http://
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/. However, these “roof knockings”
are not always benign: at least one civilian was killed from one of these “knockings” during Protective Edge.
Id.
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precautions to minimize unintended harm.”82 Likewise, another op-ed on Fox
News written by an American-born member of Knesset stated that the
precautions taken by Israel show that the “Israeli Army actually puts its own
soldiers at risk to prevent civilian casualties.”83
On the one hand, this is direct evidence of the existence of international
law: Israel would most likely not be taking these precautions if not for the
existence of Article 57(2)(c).84 However, some have confused Israel’s required
action under Protocol I with the belief that once Israel has attempted to warn
Palestinian civilians of incoming attacks, they are no longer responsible for
any civilian lives lost or damage done. As known from the understanding of
the Principle of Distinction discussed in Part I, this is absolutely not the case.
Israel is still required to limit damage done to civilians even after warning
them, and they cannot attack civilian centers if any doubt exists as to whether
the center is or is not being used for combatant purposes. That is why Navi
Pillay wrote a letter to the Human Rights Council stating, “[e]ven if Israel has
attempted to warn civilians to, for example, leave their homes or conducted an
evacuation before an attack, this does not release Israel from its obligations
under international humanitarian law.”85
For example, Israel dropped leaflets in northern Gaza on July 13, 2014
warning residents there to evacuate the area.86 Two days later, three
Palestinians were killed when Israel bombed the house of Mahmoud Zahar, a
Hamas political leader who was not home at the time.87 This attack raises a
number of concerns: it could be seen as a form of collective punishment if
Israel knew that Zahar was hiding elsewhere (which was known by the press at
82 Reuven Ben-Shalom, UNHRC is Empowering Terrorism and Degrading Human Rights, JERUSALEM
POST (July 28, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/UNHRC-is-empowering-terrorismand-degrading-human-rights-369197.
83 Dov Lipman, Israel Must Not Be Held to a Different Standard in Protecting its Citizens, FOX NEWS
(July 28, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/07/28/israel-must-not-be-held-to-different-standardin-protecting-its-citizens/.
84 Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b).
85 Navi Pillay, U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Situation in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, Statement at the Human Rights Council Twenty-first Special
Session (July 23, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14893&
LangID=E.
86 Michael Schwartz, Salma Abdelaziz & Josh Levs, Israel Drops Leaflets Warning Gaza Residents to
Evacuate Ahead of Strikes, CNN (July 13, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/13/world/meast/mideasttensions/.
87 Nidal Al-Mughrabi & Jeffrey Heller, Israel Targets Top Hamas Leader as Cease-Fire Collapses,
REUTERS (July 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/us-palestinians-israel-idUSKBN0FI0442
0140715.
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the time), meaning that Israel may have just been attempting to coerce or
punish Zahar by hurting his family. The attack could also fail the Principle of
Distinction in two key ways: first, as was explained earlier, political leaders are
not legitimate targets during wartime, even if Israel claims that they are
“terrorists,” which is not an exception to the Principle of Distinction.
Therefore, the targeting alone of Zahar could be considered a war crime under
Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute. Second, this attack could violate the
Principle of Distinction because it targeted a civilian object (a home) when
doubt existed as to whether it was being used for military purposes.
This example shows that the Realist position was not far off in the summer
of 2014 in Gaza. Although Israel abided by some areas of international law,
they also used it as a public relations tool in order to not follow through on
further obligations to civilians. Israel did not feel circumscribed by the rules of
jus in bello, and in fact used their required behavior to cover up many abuses.
CONCLUSION
The damage inflicted on Gaza during the summer of 2014 was horrendous,
but one may find it easier to sleep at night if the damage were simply the
unfortunate byproduct of a just war. However, the attacks on schools and
hospitals were potential war crimes under the Rome Statute. The Palestinians
in Gaza and the West Bank were possible victims of collective punishment.
The proportionality requirement did not seem to have been met, given the
relatively minor threat of Israeli deaths via Hamas rocket attacks. Moreover,
Israel’s most consistent upholding of international law, warnings to civilians of
incoming attacks, was repeatedly conflated by the international media with
giving Israel the authority to hurt civilians, a point in favor of the Realist
position adopted by Stephen M. Walt. Still, there may be more clarity coming:
on October 1, 2014, President Mahmud Abbas of Fatah indicated his intention
“to petition the International Criminal Court over alleged Israeli war crimes.” 88
Many obstacles stand in the way of that coming to fruition, but there is some
hope that the truth may someday be discovered.

88 Palestinians Risking US Aid over UN Bid: Abbas, YAHOO NEWS (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://news.
yahoo.com/palestinians-risking-us-aid-over-un-bid-abbas-190059291.html.

